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Abstract
This paper describes the UM-IU@LING’s sys-
tem for the SemEval 2019 Task 6: OffensEval.
We take a mixed approach to identify and cate-
gorize hate speech in social media. In subtask
A, we fine-tuned a BERT based classifier to
detect abusive content in tweets, achieving a
macro F1 score of 0.8136 on the test data, thus
reaching the 3rd rank out of 103 submissions.
In subtasks B and C, we used a linear SVM
with selected character n-gram features. For
subtask C, our system could identify the tar-
get of abuse with a macro F1 score of 0.5243,
ranking it 27th out of 65 submissions.
1 Introduction
With the increased influence of social media on
modern society, large amounts of user-generated
content emerge on the internet. Besides the ex-
change of ideas, we also see an exponential in-
crease of aggressive and potentially harmful con-
tent, for example, hate speech. If we consider the
amount of user-generated data, it is impractical
to manually identify the malicious speech. Thus
we need to develop methods to detect offensive
speech automatically through computational mod-
els. However, this task is challenging because nat-
ural language is fraught with ambiguities, and lan-
guage in social media is extremely noisy. Here
we present our method to automatically identify-
ing offensive content in tweets.
We primarily focus on detecting whether a
tweet contains offensive content or not (subtask
A), and then determining the target of the offen-
sive content (subtask C). For subtask A, we use
pre-trained word embeddings by fine-tuning the
BERT model (Devlin et al., 2018) for detecting of-
fensive tweets. For subtasks B and C, BERT did
not perform well, either because of limited train-
ing data or because we did not find the appropriate
hyperparameters. Thus we use an SVM classifier
with character n-grams as features. We acciden-
tally flipped the predicted labels in our submission
to subtask B, which is why we do not report results
of subtask B here. Among all teams participating
in OffensEval, our models ranks 3rd out of 103 on
subtask A and 27th out of 65 on subtask C. (see
Zampieri et al., 2019b).
2 Related Work
Detecting offensive language online is becom-
ing more and more important (Schmidt and Wie-
gand, 2017; Founta et al., 2018; Malmasi and
Zampieri, 2018). To build an effective classi-
fier, one of the major problems is to find the ap-
propriate features. Normally, two types of fea-
tures are utilized: surface features like n-grams
and word representations trained by neural net-
work. Most offensive language classifiers are
trained on different types of surface features with
approaches like SVM (Malmasi and Zampieri,
2018; Arroyo-Ferna´ndez et al., 2018), Random
Forest (Burnap and Williams, 2015), and Logis-
tic Regression (Davidson et al., 2017). Recently,
word embeddings trained in neural networks have
been shown to achieve good performance in offen-
sive language identification tasks (Badjatiya et al.,
2017). Benchmarks of the first shared task on ag-
gression identification (Kumar et al., 2018) show
that half of the top 15 systems are trained on neural
networks.
Using pre-trained word embeddings for feature
extraction has been shown to be highly effective in
multiple NLP tasks. Traditional word embeddings
are extracted from shallow neural networks trained
on a large swathes of texts required to learn the
contextual representations of words. Examples in-
clude skip-grams (Mikolov et al., 2013) and GloVe
(Pennington et al., 2014). However, these embed-
dings are learned from an aggregation of all possi-
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ble word contexts, which may gloss over semantic
nuances in representations.
Recent models like ELMo (Peters et al., 2018)
and BERT (Devlin et al., 2018) significantly ad-
vanced the state-of-the-art in language modeling
by learning context-sensitive representations of
words. ELMo goes beyond word embeddings by
learning representations that are functions of the
entire input sentence (Peters et al., 2018). How-
ever, ELMo is still considered shallow with two
bidirectional LSTM layers, and more recent trans-
former based language models such as the OpenAI
Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) (Rad-
ford et al., 2018) and Bidirectional Encoder Rep-
resentations from Transformers (BERT) (Devlin
et al., 2018) have been extended to a depth of
up to twelve layers. The OpenAI GPT is still
a unidirectional language model while BERT is
trained to be bidirectional with two novel predic-
tion tasks, Masked LM and Next Sentence Pre-
diction. The pre-trained BERT model has been
shown to give significant improvements in a se-
ries of downstream tasks over ELMo and OpenAI
GPT (Devlin et al., 2018).
However, identifying offensive language is not
a simple task. Challenges during identification in-
clude but are not limited to the fact that surface
language features fail to capturing subtle semantic
difference, and the shortage of undisputed anno-
tated data (Malmasi and Zampieri, 2018). Most of
previous studies focus on distinguishing between
offensive and non-offensive language (Kwok and
Wang, 2013; Djuric et al., 2015), which is the goal
of subtask A in the current shared task. But part
of challenge consists of the intertwined nature of
such messages having negative connotations and
profanity. Dinakar et al. (2011) show that it is im-
portant to tease these two factors apart. Malmasi
and Zampieri (2018) first address the issue of dis-
tinguishing hate speech from general profanity.
3 Methodology and Data
The subtasks in the shared task are rather differ-
ent. In subtask A, the goal is to identify offensive
tweets; in subtask B and C, the aim is to distin-
guish targeted and untargeted offense and to clas-
sify the targeted ones into different types. Subtask
A requires sensitivity to subtle changes in word
meaning in context while the other subtasks are
more categorical in nature. However, both suffer
from data sparsity. Therefore, we decided, backed
by empirical validation on the trial data, to utilize
different methods for the subtasks, namely, BERT
embeddings for subtask A, and an SVM classifier
for subtasks B and C.
The data collection method used to compile the
dataset in OffensEval is described by Zampieri
et al. (2019a). We used the official training data
and trial data provided by the shared task to train
the classifier. Our implmentations can be found at:
https://github.com/zytian9/SemEval-2019-Task-6.
3.1 Subtask A: Identifying Abusive Content
The goal of subtask A is to identify whether
a tweet contains offensive content by training a
model to perform binary classification. There are
13,240 tweet instances in the training data, in
which each instance has been labeled as either ’of-
fensive’ (’OFF’) or ’not offensive’ (’NOT’). The
model takes a tweet as input and predicts the cor-
responding label of that tweet. We used the trial
data as development data.
3.1.1 Model Details
For subtask A, we trained a classifier by fine-
tuning a pre-trained BERT Transformer (Devlin
et al., 2018) with a linear layer for text sequence
classification on top.
The input sentences1 were first tokenized with
the BERT basic tokenizer to perform punctuation
splitting, lower casing and invalid characters re-
moval. Then this was followed by WordPiece tok-
enization (Wu et al., 2016) to split words into sub-
word units, in accordance with the original BERT
approach (Devlin et al., 2018). The maximum se-
quence length was defined as 80, with shorter se-
quences padded and longer sequences truncated to
this length. The order of the input sequence was
represented by the learned positional embeddings.
The input representation for each tweet is the sum
of these token, segment, and position embeddings.
As only one sentence serves as input, only the sen-
tence A embeddings are used as the segment em-
beddings (Devlin et al., 2018).
We selected the BERTbase-uncased as the under-
lying BERT model. The BERTbase consists of
12 Transformer blocks, 12 self-attention heads,
and 768 hidden dimension with a total parame-
ters of 110M. It was trained on the BookCorpus
(800M words) and the English Wikipedia (2,500M
1In BERT, a “sentence” can be a text sequence of arbitrary
length. In our case, a “sentence” refers to a tweet even if it
may span multiple linguistic sentences.
words). Though the BERTlarge model was reported
to outperform the BERTbase in a variety of tasks,
training and fine tuning BERTlarge was too com-
putationally intensive given the time limit. Thus
we used BERTbase for accelerated training. The
BERTbase model includes a special classification
embedding [CLS] at the beginning of every sen-
tence, and this token in the final layer was ex-
tracted as the aggregate sequence representation
for the current classification task. Then a lin-
ear layer of 768 dimensions was added on top of
BERTbase, using the [CLS] embeddings of the
whole input sequence to predict a binary label. Bi-
nary cross-entropy was used as the loss function to
fine-tune the classifier.
3.1.2 Implementation
The neural network was implemented in Py-
Torch (Paszke et al., 2017), and we used the
tokenizer, pretrained WordPiece, and positional
embeddings and pre-trained BERT from the li-
brary pytorch-pretrained-bert2. Fol-
lowing the recommendation for fine-tuning in the
original BERT approach (Devlin et al., 2018), we
trained our classifier with a batch size of 32 for 2
epochs. The dropout probability was set to 0.1 for
all layers. Adam optimizer was used with a learn-
ing rate of 2e-5. The training was carried out on an
Nvidia 1070Ti GPU; only taking about 6 minutes
in total.
3.2 Subtask B: Categorizing Offense Types
For subtasks B and C, we adopted an SVM clas-
sifier. For these two tasks, the BERT classifier
performed close to the baseline on the trial data.
This could be caused by the limited amount of the
training data for these two tasks or inappropriate
selection of hyperparameters. Thus, we built a lin-
ear SVM classifier to identify the offense type and
target.
Subtask B requires the distinction between tar-
geted and untargeted offense. We used an SVM
classifier with selected character n gram features
for subtask B. For the trial data of subtask B, the
classifier achieved a macro F1 score of 0.5333 and
accuracy of 0.5714; both of them considerably
higher than the baseline. But since the labels of
two classes were accidentally flipped in our sub-
mission, our results were not competitive. We also
reconstructed test F1 from the flipped confusion
2https://github.com/huggingface/pytorch-pretrained-
BERT
matrix. If the labels were not flipped, the test F1
should be 0.5946.
3.3 Subtask C: Identifying the Target of
Abuse
Subtask C requires the classifier to identify three
types of offense target, ’Individual’ (’IND’),
’Group’(’GRP’) and ’Other’(’OTH’). The training
set is rather imbalanced: The minority class OTH
constitutes around 10 percent of all the instances,
and only occurs once in the trial data. We origi-
nally were planning to use the same approach as
for subtasks A. However, experiments on the trial
data showed a weak performance. For this reason,
we decided to use a linear SVM classifier to iden-
tify the offense target with three sub-classes since
previous studies indicate that SVM classifiers per-
form well on classification tasks and at par with
deep neural networks when features are well se-
lected (Founta et al., 2018; Kumar et al., 2018).
For this classifier, we used the Scikit-learn (Pe-
dregosa et al., 2011) implementation, and we used
only the training data provided by the shared task.
3.3.1 Model Details
Given that character-level n-gram could reduce
the effect of spelling errors and variations in
tweets (Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017), we used a
bag of character n-grams (with n ranging from
2 to 7 characters) as features in order to charac-
terize the users’ language features as robustly as
possible. Since in subtask C, we need to iden-
tify different types of offense target, we assume
that named entity information will be effective for
identifying target types. Named entities informa-
tion was extracted by spaCy, which is based on
the entity types from OntoNotes 5 corpus3. Given
that this task aims to identify three types of tar-
gets, namely individual, group and other, we used
the named entity information by classifying all the
entity types into three major types and counting
the number of each type separately. The first type
only includes PERSON entities, the second type
consists of entity types related to a group sense,
for example ORG, NORG, and GPE, and the last
type includes all occurrences of the other entity
types.
Nobata et al. (2016) found that linguistic fea-
tures such as tweet length, average word length,
3https://spacy.io/api/annotation#
named-entities
System F1 macro Accuracy
All OFF baseline 0.2182 0.2790
All NOT baseline 0.4189 0.7209
BERTbase-uncased 0.8136 0.8570
Table 1: The official UM-IU@LING result for subtask
A, in comparison to the baselines.
System F1 macro Accuracy
All OFF baseline 0.1934 0.2399
All NOT baseline 0.4319 0.7601
SVMcharacter-ngram 0.8267 0.8782
BERTbase-uncased 0.8388 0.8722
BERTbase-cased 0.8094 0.8500
BERTbase-multiling-unc. 0.4300 0.7625
BERTbase-multiling-cased 0.8179 0.8718
Table 2: Results on the trial data for subtask A.
number of punctuation, number of discourse con-
nectives can be useful for detecting abusive lan-
guage. In this study, we adopt 9 features from
their work. Besides the n-gram features, named
entity, and linguistic features, we also adopted
emoji and emoticons as additional features, which
have been shown to be useful in sentiment analysis
tasks (Kouloumpis et al., 2011; Shiha and Ayvaz,
2017). Emoticons are extracted using the s regu-
lar expressions by C. Potts4. We also added three
emoji sentiment features, which consist of the pos-
itive, negative, and overall sentiment scores based
on the Emoji Sentiment Ranking (Novak et al.,
2015).
We performed feature selection for the n-gram
features using a filtering approach with informa-
tion gain, which has proven to be effective in so-
cial media sentiment classification (Ku¨bler et al.,
2018).
Our final submission is a linear SVM clas-
sifier (C=0.1, squared-hinge loss function) with
1000 selected character n-grams of length 2-7.
Adding linguistic and emoji features resulted in
small gains on the trial data and was that not con-
sidered useful for the official version.
4 Results
4.1 Subtask A
Our best result for subtask A along with the of-
ficial baselines are summarized in Table 1. The
4http://sentiment.christopherpotts.net/tokenizing.html
#emoticons
NO
T
OF
F
Predicted label
NOT
OFF
Tr
ue
 la
be
l
576 44
79 161
Confusion Matrix
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Figure 1: The UM-IU@LING confusion matrix for
subtask A.
BERT classifier achieved a macro F1 score of
0.8136, clearly exceeding the baseline of 0.4189
and ranking the system 3rd out of 103 submis-
sions. This demonstrates that our model can ef-
fectively identify whether a given tweet contains
offensive content or not. The confusion matrix
in Figure 1 further illustrates the error pattern of
our classifier, which more often misclassified of-
fensive tweets as being not offensive. One expla-
nation of the results may be the classifier’s prefer-
ence for the majority class. But it is possible that
our classifier may not capture some of the subtle
nuances in meaning and contexts. However, the
results also show that the macro F1 score is only
about 4.5 percent points lower than the accuracy
(0.8136 vs. 0.8570). This is a clear indication that
the classifier is successful in modeling the minor-
ity class of offensive tweets.
4.1.1 Ablation Analysis
We performed an ablation analysis on our BERT
classifier using the training and the trial data. First,
we retrained the classifier by varying the learn-
ing rate. The macro F1 dropped to the baseline
of 0.4318 with a learning rate of either 2e-8 or 2e-
3, which indicates that the system is sensitive to
change in learning rates.
The selection of sequence length only has a
minimal influence on the final performance, with
a tendency for longer sequence length to improves
prediction accuracy: Setting the input sequence
length to 60 reduces the macro F1 minimally to
0.8212, and decreasing the input length to 40 de-
creases the macro F1 to 0.8126.
ID Tweet Label Prediction
50 okay but it actually sucks so much that the first year I COULD go to
every Reeperbahn Festival day, I’m in Strasbourg and can only attend
the last day
NOT OFF
263 My mom just called me and said she is joining the NFL boycott. How
many of yall are with us? F that league #NFLBoycott
OFF NOT
126 @User @User @User They don’t. The GOP will keep supporting rack-
eteer, illegitimate Trump. They never will stop the corruption of tRump.
They are in it for the money. They want to destroy American democracy.
NOT OFF
Table 3: Misclassified examples for subtask A from the trial data. Usernames are anonymized.
There are several versions of pre-trained
BERTbase5. We compared the performance of
these different versions of BERTbase and the re-
sults are summarized in Table 2. Generally, these
variants of BERTbase tend to give similar perfor-
mance but BERTbase-uncased achieved the best per-
formance on the trial data. It is unclear why
BERTbase-multilingual-uncased did not learn to perform
the task beyond the baseline. Additional hyper-
parameter tuning might be necessary in this case.
Overall, these results demonstrate that though
BERT can give superior performance in detect-
ing hate speech, it is somewhat sensitive to the
change of hyperparameters. We also find that the
SVM classifier achieved a higher accuracy on the
trial data, but there is a significant drop in macro
F1 when compared with the BERT model. This
shows that the BERT model performs better on the
minority class.
4.1.2 Error Analysis
We show examples of misclassified tweets in Ta-
ble 3. In example 263, the BERT classifier failed
to identify the offensive word “F”. It is com-
mon for people to use euphemisms to tone down
swear words in certain situations. The classifier
could miss these word variants, especially when
the word variant is the only offensive word in the
given tweet. For tweet 50, the word “sucks” is
the only word that is often used offensively. How-
ever, the given tweet is not offensive because the
author only describes their mood instead of insult-
ing someone else. These misclassifications seem
to indicate that the classifier reacts to trigger words
with negative connotations but may not be capable
of interpreting the words with respect to the larger
context.
When examining the prediction errors, we con-
5https://github.com/google-research/bert
System F1 macro Accuracy
All GRP baseline 0.1787 0.3662
All IND baseline 0.2130 0.4695
All OTH baseline 0.0941 0.1643
SVM classifier 0.5243 0.6854
Table 4: The official UM-IU@LING results (SVM) for
subtask C.
System F11 macro Acc.
All IND baseline 0.3041 0.8387
All GRP baseline 0.0762 0.1290
All OTH baseline 0.0208 0.0323
SVMcharacter-ngram 0.3915 0.8065
SVMword-ngram 0.3554 0.6774
SVMchar+ling+emoji 0.3971 0.8065
SVMchar+ling+emoji+entity 0.3901 0.7742
Table 5: Results on the trial data for subtask C.
sistently noticed that the BERT classifier is highly
effective in identifying tweets with words that are
negative or offensive in most linguistic contexts.
The real challenge is that not all tweets containing
negative or potentially insulting words are offen-
sive; there are subtle differences between a nega-
tive opinion and an insult towards someone. How-
ever, the model cannot distinguish these subtle
differences in meaning in the proper cultural or
socio-political contexts. Additionally, it is not ro-
bust enough to detect swear word variants or atyp-
ical spellings common in social media.
4.2 Subtask C
Table 4 shows our best result for subtask C in
comparison to the official baselines. The macro
F1 score of the SVM classifier is 0.5243, which
is considerably higher than the baseline and ranks
the system 27th out of 65 submissions. The con-
fusion matrix in Figure 2 indicates that our classi-
ID Tweet Label Prediction
17 @User Obama fed the country shit sandwiches for 8 years. Maybe Jim
just has his addled mind confused about dates and who fed who what..
GRP IND
22 @User The Catholic Church is really screwed up. Nothing new here. GRP OTH
31 @User Yeah thanks to your Nobel Emmy award winning idiot chief flip
flopping on everything from Iran to gun control.
IND GRP
Table 6: Misclassified examples from the trial data for subtask C.
fier performed well on identifying the IND class,
was effective for the GRP class, but often failed
to distinguish the OTH class from the other two
classes. This clearly shows that the sparsity of
training data for the minority class OTH affects
the performance of our classifier negatively.
The performance of the classifier with differ-
ent features is shown in Table 5. Since there are
only 31 instances in the trial set and it is rather im-
balanced, we can see that the highest accuracy is
reached by classifying all examples as IND, i.e.,
the all IND baseline. Even though none of the
classifiers outperformed the baseline in terms of
accuracy, all the classifiers achieved significantly
higher macro F1 scores, which shows that they are
better at identifying the other two classes. After
adding linguistic and emoji features, the charac-
ter n-gram model showed a slight improvement in
macro F1 score and achieved the highest accuracy
along with the simple character n-gram model.
But both macro F1 and accuracy dropped when en-
tity information was added.
Table 6 presents examples of misclassified
tweets in the trial set. In example 17, two per-
sons are mentioned, “Obama” and “Jim’, and both
of them are insulted, however not as a group but
individually. The classifier labeled this exam-
ple as IND. In example 22, the classifier is mis-
guided by the word ’Church’ and wrongly classi-
fies it as OTH. Example 31 is similar to example
17. Here, there are two potential targets, ’Nobel
Emmy award winning idiot’ and ’Iran’ that could
trigger the group sense, which significantly affects
the classifier’s judgment.
The errors analysis indicates that the classifier
has the ability to distinguish individual and group
targets, but it fails to capture the relation between
different entities and sometimes misidentifies the
target category of offensive language.
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Figure 2: Confusion matrix for the SVM classifier for
subtask C.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we report our systems for OffensEval
subtasks A and C. In subtask A, we trained a neu-
ral network based classifier by fine-tuning the pre-
trained BERTbase model to detect offensive tweets.
In subtask C, we used a linear SVM with charac-
ter n-gram features to identify the target of hate
speech.
The evaluation results indicate that our sys-
tem is capable of detecting offensive language ro-
bustly, and it has a good chance of identifying the
target. However, there is room for improvement.
In the future, in order to capture subtle meaning
and overcome the data sparsity, we plan to take
syntactic and semantic features into consideration
and investigate the combination of selected sur-
face features and pre-trained word embeddings.
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